By Willard C. Matthias
This survey of greater than fifty years of nationwide protection coverage juxtaposes declassified U.S. nationwide intelligence estimates with lately published Soviet records disclosing the perspectives of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies at the related occasions. Matthias exhibits that U.S. intelligence estimates have been frequently right yet that our political and army leaders more often than not missed them—with occasionally disastrous effects. The booklet starts with a glance again on the position of U.S. intelligence in the course of international warfare II, from Pearl Harbor in the course of the plot opposed to Hitler and the D-Day invasion to the "unconditional quit" of Japan, and divulges how greater use of the intelligence on hand may have kept many lives and shortened the battle. the subsequent chapters facing the chilly conflict expose what info and suggestion U.S. intelligence analysts handed directly to policymakers, and in addition what occasionally sour coverage debates happened in the Communist camp, touching on Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile situation, the turmoil in japanese Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars within the heart East, and the Soviet intervention in Afganistan. in lots of methods, this can be a tale of neglected possibilities the U.S. executive needed to behavior a extra in charge overseas coverage that may have kept away from huge losses of existence and large bills on hands buildups. whereas no longer exonerating the CIA for its personal errors, Matthias casts new mild at the contributions that goal intelligence research did make through the chilly warfare and speculates on what may need occurred if that evaluation and suggestion were heeded.
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Extra info for America's Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936-1991
Only a month later, on August 1. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence (New York: Random House, 1995), 26. S. ” Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, still a member of the Soviet bloc, had spoken about a worldwide struggle against reactionaries, and the Soviets had reopened the Straits issue with a diplomatic note to Ankara demanding joint control of the Bosporus and the Hellespont by the Black Sea powers. These were treated in the memorandum as suggesting the possibility of aggressive Soviet intentions. ” In short, the memorandum engaged in a back-and-forth review of considerations bearing upon the question of Soviet military aggression.
Others have thought that he did not want to acknowledge it because it would show that his successes were due to good intelligence rather than his own generalship. S. S. troops took a beating was in the Ardennes in December 1944. After the Allied break-out from the Normandy peninsula at the end of July in 1944, the subsequent destruction of German forces in the Falaise pocket, the capture of Paris on August 24, and the British campaign to secure Antwerp early in September, Allied armies did not press on, but stopped at the German border.
As he developed contacts with German exiles and disaffected German officials, he not only found out much about what was going on in Germany but also became a conduit to the West for the plotters in their search for encouragement and, if possible, cooperation from the Allied powers. They got very little. After the war, Dulles wrote an account of the plot in his book, Germany’s Underground. In the foreword, he explained his purpose in writing it: There was an anti-Nazi underground working in Germany, despite the general impression to the contrary.
America's Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936-1991 by Willard C. Matthias