By Sebastian Reyn
Through the Sixties, Charles de Gaulle’s maximum quarrel used to be with the american citizens. the yank angle in the direction of this forceful ecu chief used to be, in spite of the fact that, an both defining a part of the dispute. during this riveting examine of transatlantic diplomacy, Sebastian Reyn lines American responses to de Gaulle’s overseas coverage from 1958 to 1969, concluding that how american citizens judged de Gaulle depended principally on no matter if their politics leaned to the left or the fitting.
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Additional resources for Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle, 1958-1969
4. The French Government suggests that the questions raised in this note be the object as soon as possible of consultations among the United States, Great Britain and France. 89 It would be wrong to seek the reasons for de Gaulle’s tripartite proposal exclusively in his personal convictions and experiences. 90 French demands for institutionalized great power status within the Western alliance actually go as far back as the negotiations over the North Atlantic Treaty. 95 Consecutive French governments thus strove to strengthen France’s position within the Western alliance by formalizing participation in some kind of tripartite formula with the United States and Great Britain.
30 In American eyes, France was thus a weak and unreliable ally, a vital but vulnerable link in the alliance, unable to govern itself or to come to terms with issues facing it in the wider world. Even as consecutive administrations looked to France to lead the continental allies toward greater cooperation and integration, the experiences with the Fourth Republic meant that its endeavors to gain recognition as a major power never met the full approval of the United States. This was no different for Eisenhower.
The organizational aspects of de Gaulle’s proposal were also subject to speculation. Would the tripartite organization have a staff and a secretariat? Was it to be part of the existing structures of the Atlantic alliance, for instance by building on the existing Standing Group or creating a parallel political standing group? All these matters could be discussed, as de Gaulle had proposed, by the representatives of the three powers in Washington. But the Eisenhower administration, as we will see, was understandably wary of entering into any discussions.
Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle, 1958-1969 by Sebastian Reyn